Q&A: H1N1 pandemic influenza - what's new? by Turner, Stephen J et al.
The World Health Organization has announced the 
end of the (H1N1) influenza A (H1N1) pandemic - 
what does this mean?
In 2009, the new H1N1 pandemic virus exhibited several 
features that distinguished it from seasonal influenza: it 
caused  major  outbreaks  in  the  northern  hemisphere 
summer  and  autumn,  it  quickly  dominated  over  other 
influenza  viruses  circulating  in  humans,  and  it  caused 
widespread  disease  because  of  the  lack  of  significant 
population  immunity,  particularly  in  young  people.  In 
2010, the pandemic virus is behaving more like a seasonal 
influenza virus in that summer outbreaks have not been 
seen, it is co-circulating with seasonal A(H3N2) and B 
viruses, and the intensity of transmission is now lower 
than  in  2009.  For  these  reasons,  the  World  Health 
Organization  (WHO)  downgraded  its  pandemic  alert 
from phase 6 to the post-pandemic phase on 10 August 
2010. Fortunately, in contrast to descriptions of the 1918 
Spanish influenza pandemic, there has been no apparent 
change  in  disease  severity  over  the  first  18  months  of 
circulation of this virus.
Does this mean that the pandemic H1N1 influenza 
virus is no longer a threat?
Not  necessarily,  not  altogether.  Several  features  of  this 
virus  are  a  continued  cause  for  concern;  for  example, 
most hospitalizations and deaths are still in those under 
60 years old. This is probably because people in this age 
group are less likely to be immune. Furthermore, of those 
people admitted to hospital in the USA with confirmed 
influenza  (H1N1)  2009  pneumonia,  almost  two-thirds 
end  up  in  intensive  care.  Recent  clinical  studies  have 
identified risk factors for severe disease that include, but 
are  not  limited  to,  obesity,  cardiovascular  disease  and 
pregnancy.  Importantly,  however,  about  one-third  of 
those who have died with (H1N1) 2009 lacked any known 
risk  factors  [1].  It  is  also  of  concern  that  the  human 
influenza  (H1N1)  2009  virus  can  be  found  in  limited 
instances within pig populations, the species from which 
it  emerged  [2].  This  increases  the  opportunity  for  the 
virus to reassort with other avian and swine viruses to 
produce  new  influenza  strains  of  unpredictable  trans-
missibility and virulence [3]. (Figure 1 illustrates schema-
tically how new pandemic influenza viruses are thought 
to arise.)
Is there any sign of reassortment between different 
viruses?
When we last wrote on this [4], there was no evidence of 
reassortment between the influenza (H1N1) 2009 virus 
and other viruses, avian or seasonal. However, the recent 
re-introduction of influenza (H1N1) 2009 into swine that 
we  have  just  mentioned  does  provide  the  potential,  if 
limited,  of  reassortment  with  other  swine  influenza 
viruses [3]. Also of concern, Octaviani and colleagues [5] 
recently used a modified in vitro reassortment strategy to 
ask how easily the current pandemic virus could reassort 
with  a  highly  pathogenic  H5N1  avian  influenza,  and 
found, surprisingly, that 85% of the viruses they obtained 
from  this  mixing  experiment  were  reassortants.  This 
means  that  there  is  excellent  genetic  compatibility 
between these two viruses, a characteristic that had been 
difficult  to  show  between  HPAI  H5N1  and  seasonal 
influenza viruses current before the pandemic. Reassor-
tant viruses containing the HPAI H5 and N1 components 
with  polymerase  subunits  from  the  H1N1  pandemic 
virus were not only fit but could replicate better than the 
parent  H5N1  virus.  This  highlights  the  need  for 
continued surveillance of influenza viruses in the various 
animal  reservoirs,  particularly  in  regions  where  HPAI 
H5N1 is endemic.
What about antigenic drift?
Despite intense surveillance by the WHO Global Influ-
enza Surveillance Network and other systems, significant 
antigenic drift has not yet been detected in circulating 
H1N1  2009  viruses.  However,  we  expect  that  it  will 
appear over the next year or so.
A key driver for antigenic drift in the influenza virus 
HA  glycoprotein  is  immune  pressure  by  the  specific 
antibody  response.  Recent  serological  analyses  in  a 
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the  pandemic  H1N1  virus  in  up  to  40%  of  surveyed 
individuals [6], suggesting exposure either by infection or 
by  vaccination.  The  Centers  for  Disease  Control  and 
Prevention  in  the  USA  recently  estimated  there  have 
been 43 to 88 million cases of pandemic infection [7]. 
Taken together, these data suggest that a large number of 
people are immune to the virus. So although it appears 
that the threshold level of population immunity required 
to  drive  antigenic  drift  has  not  yet  been  reached,  we 
might expect antigenic variants to emerge over the next 
year or so as the pool of susceptible individuals declines.
Are there any new clues to why susceptibility was 
so high, especially among younger people, in the 
first place?
Yes.  What  has  emerged  recently  is  a  clear  molecular 
mechanism  explaining  the  lack  of  immunity  to  the 
influenza  H1N1  2009  virus  in  most  of  the  population. 
Comparison  of  the  hemagglutinin  structures  of  A/
California/04/2009 H1N1 and seasonal influenza viruses 
has shown significant variation within the antigenic sites 
recognized by specific antibodies [8]. In the same study, a 
high degree of structural similarity between 2009 H1N1 
and 1918 H1N1-like viruses was also evident. Together 
these analyses provide an explanation for the suscep  ti-
bility of younger individuals and, conversely, the increased 
resistance  of  older  individuals  who  may  have  been 
exposed to 1918-like H1N1 viruses in the first half of the 
20th century [9].
There are also indications that there may be less cross-
protection  from  T-cell  responses  to  earlier  seasonal 
viruses than had been supposed. Influenza-specific T-cell 
immunity is often directed against peptide components 
derived  from  the  more  conserved  internal  viral  gene 
products,  such  as  nucleoprotein,  matrix  protein  1  or 
Figure 1. Mutation and reassortment giving rise to antigenic drift and antigenic shift in different hosts of influenza virus. The surface 
hemagglutinin and neuraminidase molecules (blue) of influenza viruses, which play an essential part in viral recognition of and entry into host cells, 
undergo frequent mutation (antigenic drift) in their human hosts, giving rise to new variants (red dots) that can elude antibodies made in many 
individuals against the parent virus. Less frequently, entire segments of the eight-segment genome of an avian influenza virus and a human virus 
become reassorted into the same virion, usually through infection of swine by both viruses, and this can result in a virus that is still adapted to infect 
humans but expresses an avian hemagglutinin or neuraminidase (antigenic shift) to which there is no prior immunity in human populations. These 
give rise periodically to pandemics. Figure reproduced with permission from Figure 10-17 of: DeFranco AL, et al. 2007 [24].
http://jbiol.com/content/8/5/46/figure/F1 
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sidered  more  able  to  provide  heterologous  immunity 
because the targets are more likely to be shared between 
different influenza strains and subtypes. There are studies 
that  have  demonstrated  the  presence  of  cross-reactive 
T cell responses between seasonal and pandemic influ-
enza, supporting the notion that these responses may be 
important  in  ameloriating  infection  in  the  absence  of 
antibody immunity [10,11]. However, recent data suggest 
this may not always be the case. Peptides from different 
influenza  strains  and  commonly  targeted  by  the  T-cell 
response  can  vary  extensively  in  amino  acid  sequence, 
and  even  when  they  are  able  to  bind  the  same  major 
histocompatibility complex (MHC) molecule (on which 
they  are  presented  for  recognition  by  T  cells),  T  cells 
specific for one variant peptide may not recognize the 
other: this has been shown specifically for the seasonal as 
against the pandemic virus [12]. Thus, despite evidence 
that many individuals have pre-existing influenza-specific 
T-cell immunity [13], these findings suggest that, just as 
with  antibody  immunity,  previous  exposure  to  one 
subtype  does  not  guarantee  effective  cross-protective 
immunity.  This  may  also  help  to  explain  why  the 
pandemic virus was able to spread so quickly.
Do we know any more about why some people are 
particularly severely affected?
It is clear that in animal models of infection, as well as in 
human clinical studies, the influenza A (H1N1) virus can 
replicate more extensively in the lower lung. Clinical data 
have shown that key risk factors for more severe infection 
include obesity, diabetes and immunosuppression among 
other underlying conditions [1]. Clinical studies point to 
a lack of effective immunity and dysregulated pro-inflam-
matory responses in those individuals worst affected by 
infection. For example, a paper presented at the recent 
Options for the Control of Influenza VII meeting in Hong 
Kong demonstrated that patients admitted to intensive 
care had poor immune reactivity (T and B cell) combined 
with  pronounced  production  of  pro-inflammatory 
cytokines, particularly IL-6. In other unpublished data, at 
the  recent  International  Congress  of  Immunology  in 
Japan, Rafi Ahmed presented a molecular characteri  za-
tion of the specific B-cell response in pandemic-infected 
individuals. By isolating specific B cells and cloning the 
antibody receptors, he was able to take a census of the 
types  of  antibodies  induced  after  infection.  Firstly,  he 
showed  that  about  a  third  of  anti  bodies  isolated  from 
those individuals who recovered quickly from infection 
were derived from pre-existing memory B cells and had 
undergone mutation. This resulted in a repertoire of anti-
bodies  that  were  more  specific  for  pandemic  than  for 
seasonal  influenza.  This  goes  against  the  ‘original 
antigenic  sin’  theory,  according  to  which  pre-existing 
immunity  to  one  influenza  virus  is  proposed  to  limit 
induction  of  immunity  to  subsequent  infection  with 
another. Impor  tantly, in one individual admit  ted to the 
intensive care unit with severe respiratory distress syn-
drome induced by pandemic infection, the same analysis 
of antibody responses demonstrated poor induction of 
specific  antibody.  These  data  together  suggest  that  a 
combination of underlying risk factors and an inability to 
mount  robust  immune  responses  and  to  regu  late  pro-
inflammatory responses contributes to disease severity.
Why is the virus so highly transmissible?
The efficiency of influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus trans-
mission does not appear to be any greater than that of 
seasonal  influenza.  A  key  factor  in  the  rapid  and 
sustained global spread of the virus during 2009 was the 
very  large  pool  of  susceptible  individuals  due  to  low 
population immunity.
But  there  have  been  some  recent  advances  in 
identifying the molecular determinants of transmission - 
that is to say, the molecular factors that promote spread 
of the virus between individuals. Using influenza reverse 
genetics, two groups introduced known virulence deter-
mi  nants  into  the  influenza  A  (H1N1)  2009  pandemic 
virus  and  used  these  viruses  to  study  the  impact  of 
transmission  in  a  ferret  model  of  infection.  Lysine  at 
position 627 of the PB2 protein has been reported to be a 
virulence  determinant  in  the  highly  pathogenic  HPAI 
H5N1  avian  influenza  virus  [14]  and  is  absent  in  the 
pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009 viruses. Reassuringly, 
introduction of this mutation made very little difference 
to transmission efficiency and pathogenesis and in fact 
has been reported to attenuate transmission [15].
Another factor is how well the virus binds to receptors 
in the airways. There is clear evidence that specific amino 
acids in the hemagglutinin molecule, particularly within 
the  binding  site  whereby  it  recognizes  its  receptor  on 
cells,  dictate  specificity  for  either  α2,3-  or  α2,6-linked 
sialic  acids.  Human  influenza  viruses  have  an  aspartic 
acid (D) at positions 190 and 222 in the hemagglutinin 
that impart α2,6-sialic acid binding. In contrast, the avian 
influenza virus preferentially recognizes α2,3-linked sialic 
acids, and this preference is determined by glutamic acid 
(E) and glycine (G) at positions 190 and 222, respectively. 
Of  particular  interest  was  an  experiment  reported  by 
Tumpey  and  colleagues  at  the  recent  Options  for  the 
Control of Influenza VII meeting in Hong Kong early in 
September.  They  used  a  mouse-adapted  pandemic 
(H1N1) strain with a D to G mutation at position 222 of 
hemagglutinin [16]. This was predicted to reduce trans-
mission  and  pathogenesis  in  their  ferret  model  of 
infection. It failed to do either. What was of more interest 
was  that  introduction  of  a  I219K  mutation  into  the 
pandemic virus did result in increased transmission but 
Turner et al. BMC Biology 2010, 8:130 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7007/8/130
Page 3 of 6no  change  in  pathogenesis.  This  tells  us  that  there  is 
potential for these viruses to undergo further adaptation 
to human hosts and confirms the need for vigilance in 
our surveillance.
How far has the virus become resistant to 
neuraminidase inhibitors?
Two neuraminidase inhibitors have been widely used in 
the  prophylaxis  or  treatment  of  pandemic  (H1N1) 
influenza:  oseltamivir  (marketed  as  Tamiflu)  and,  to  a 
lesser extent, zanamivir (Relenza). Oseltamivir-resistant 
pandemic  strains  have  been  detected,  often  associated 
with  prolonged  treatment  of  severe  cases,  but  to  date 
there is little evidence of sustained spread of these strains 
among  untreated  individuals.  As  the  most  common 
oseltamivir  resistance  mutation  (an  H  to  Y  change  at 
position 275) is close to the substrate-binding site of the 
neuraminidase  protein,  it  was  expected  from  earlier 
animal  studies  that  such  mutants  would  be  less 
transmissible  than  their  wild-type  counterparts.  There 
are conflicting data on this issue. For example, the H275Y 
oseltamivir  resistance  mutation  emerged  in  seasonal 
(H1N1) viruses in late 2007 and spread globally during 
2008  in  the  absence  of  widespread  usage  of  the  drug, 
suggesting  that  the  mutation  had  not  impaired  viral 
transmissibility.  Subsequent  work  has  identified 
‘permissive’  mutations  that  restored  the  fitness  of  these 
viruses [17]. There are contradicting reports on the impact 
of  oseltamivir  resistance  on  transmission  of  pandemic 
influenza strains in ferret models, with one demonstrating 
lower transmission [18], and the other showing no impact 
[19]. The reason for this difference is still unclear, so there 
is plainly a need to monitor the behavior of such drug-
resistant viruses in humans carefully.
How effective has vaccination been?
Initial  clinical  trials  demonstrated  that  the  monovalent 
influenza  (H1N1)  2009  vaccine  is  immunogenic  and 
capable of inducing levels of antibody that are considered 
protective  [20].  There  is  also  evidence  that  vaccination 
reduces not only the risk of infection but also subsequent 
transmission to others [21]. Vaccination remains the single 
most effective method of protection from influenza.
That  said,  it  may  still  be  too  early  to  tell  just  how 
effective  vaccination  against  the  pandemic  virus  has 
been. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the 
initial roll-out of the vaccine occurred too late to affect 
the first pandemic wave. For example, Australia received 
the  monovalent  vaccine  in  late  September  2009. 
Although this was only 5 months after selection of the 
vaccine strain, winter was over and the initial pandemic 
wave had subsided. Importantly, there has been strong 
collective  uptake  of  the  monovalent  pandemic  vaccine 
and the later trivalent seasonal vaccine (which included 
the  pandemic  (H1N1)  strain)  in  Australia,  probably 
because  of  an  effective  public  education  program. 
According  to  recent  Australian  Government  reports, 
influenza  activity  is  rising  even  though  spring  is  now 
beginning  in  Australia.  It  will  be  interesting  to  see 
whether the delay in onset of the influenza season and its 
relatively low activity is due to the extensive vaccination 
program. We have to wait and see.
Has there been any progress on making a 
predictive vaccine or in the mode of flu vaccine 
manufacture?
The most important impediment to vaccine intervention 
during the early stages of the pandemic was a delay in 
availability. Although the full sequence of the new virus 
was publicly available within days of its identification in 
April 2009 and a suitable vaccine strain was recom  men-
ded by WHO just one month later, vaccine production 
and deployment were significantly delayed by low virus 
yields in eggs and a number of regulatory hurdles. As a 
consequence, there is a lot of interest in developing new 
vaccine  strategies  that  generate  more  broadly  cross-
reactive immunity. More recent advances have been in 
generating antibody responses against conserved regions 
of  the  hemagglutinin  protein  rather  than  the  more 
variable regions found within the globular head of the 
protein. In a recent report, Gary Nabel and colleagues 
demon  strated  that  a  DNA/recombinant  adenovirus 
prime-boost  strategy  generated  antibodies  that  cross-
reacted with antigenically distinct influenza strains [22]. 
They  were  able  to  demonstrate  these  cross-reactive 
antibodies target the more conserved stalk region. It is 
proposed that antibody binding in this region can impede 
the  hemagglutinin  conformational  changes  that  are 
required for virus infectivity. This has been taken a step 
further by Peter Palese and colleagues [23], who used the 
hemagglutinin  stalk  region  alone  as  the  immunogen. 
Again,  actively  targeting  the  stalk  region  in  a  vaccine 
strategy  induced  cross-reactive  antibodies,  although 
protective efficacy is yet to be determined. Such strategies 
are promising but still have a way to go, particularly if 
pharmaceutical  companies  are  to  commit  to  replacing 
current vaccine formulations.
Looking to the future - how quickly would we know 
if we had a new virus?
Although it took only a few days from initial identification 
of  the  influenza  (H1N1)  2009  virus  in  Mexico  and 
California in April to the announcement by WHO that its 
emergence  was  a  public  health  event  of  international 
concern (indicating its pandemic potential), the virus had 
in fact been circulating in humans for at least 2 months. 
Could  we  have  acted  earlier  to  prevent  or  reduce  the 
impact  of  the  pandemic?  More  specifically,  if  we  had 
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have accelerated detection and response to the new virus 
in humans? Yes, but not on its own. Early detection of 
new  reassortants  in  pigs  will  be  useful  if  it  triggers 
enhanced surveillance for human cases. The most critical 
need is for rapid detection and laboratory investigation of 
unusual disease outbreaks combined with open sharing 
of  information  and  material  with  national  and 
international health authorities.
How could we respond if a new pandemic virus 
emerged in the near future?
Fortunately,  our  worst  fears  were  not  realized  in  the 
influenza A (H1N1) 2009 pandemic. However, despite all 
the advances in technology, surveillance and pandemic 
planning,  the  virus  spread  globally  within  months, 
reminding us how difficult it is to control. There were a 
number of positive outcomes. One was the rapid sharing 
of  information  and  strains  between  different  parties 
around  the  world.  This  was  critical  in  helping 
governments  and  international  agencies  to  shape  an 
appropriate  response  to  an  uncertain  threat  and  in 
enabling manufacturers to produce a new vaccine within 
5 months of the first detection of the virus. While some 
quarters have criticized the response as excessive, it is 
likely the pandemic would have posed a greater problem 
in  the  absence  of  such  interventions.  Another  positive 
outcome was the opportunity to evaluate the effective-
ness of pandemic plans with a view to ensuring improve-
ments.  Furthermore,  the  emergence  of  pandemic 
influenza  (H1N1)  2009  stimulated  a  large  amount  of 
research,  resulting  in  new  and  important  knowledge 
about  the  virus  itself  -  all  important  for  refining  and 
strengthening our preparedness for future pandemics.
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